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CASE NOTES
municipalities of less than 500,000 who are similarly situated as those in a
city with more, and that the indemnity to policemen does not promise to
remedy the situation sought to be improved, the doubtful reasonableness
of the classification and the resulting discrimination are such as would
seem to justify a striking of the statute in question.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
NON-CAPITAL CASES
Petitioner, a minor eighteen years of age, pleaded guilty upon arraign-
ment to three indictments of armed robbery and larceny. Plaintiff was
neither offered nor did he receive advice of counsel. A petition for a
writ of habeas corpus was filed on grounds that permitting plaintiff to
plead guilty without advice of counsel is so unfair that it violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' In denying the petition,
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that there is always a pre-
sumption that the court exercised its proper discretion when it allowed a
defendant over seventeen years of age to plead guilty without aid of
counsel, and that this presumption was not overcome. The court con-
cluded that the fair conduct of these matters must depend upon the wis-
dom and understanding of the trial judge. Fitzgibbons v. Hancock, 82 A.
2d 769 (N.H., 195').
Under the Sixth Amendment2 the right to the appointment of counsel
in any federal criminal case is absolute where the benefit of counsel has
not been waived.3 However, the rule's counterpart, the right ot counsel in
state cases, has remained uncertain. Earlier cases attempted to make a dis-
tinction between capital and non-capital state crimes, but the severity of
punishment in non-capital cases and the lack of a definite rule even
as to capital cases caused this distinction to suffer harsh criticism.4 The
first semblance of any concrete rule for the states was presented in the
case of Betts v. Brady.5 The petitioner in that case, forty-three years of
age and of average intelligence, was convicted of robbery after his request
for counsel was denied. A petition for habeas corpus was denied on the
grounds that the Sixth Amendment guarantee was good only in federal
cases.
The Betts case established the fundamental rule for determining whether
I U.S. Const. Amend. 14. 2 U.S. Const. Amend. 6.
3 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
4 Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471
(194S); Odom v. State, 2o5 Miss. 572, 37 So. 2d 300 (1948); State v. Hedgebeth,
228 N.C. 259, 45 S.E. 2d 563 (1947); Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So. 2d 671 (1941);
Watson v. State, 142 Fla. 218, 194 So-64o (1940).
5 P6 U.S. 455 (1942)"
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or not denial of counsel in a state criminal case will constitute violation
of a defendant's rights under the due process clause. The Betts rule
required counsel for all persons charged with serious crimes, when
necessary for their adequate defense. This standard was said to depend
upon the individual case and the particular person accused.' However,
this standard was not definite enough to stand up entirely in a later de-
cision which demanded the appointment of counsel "only where the pri-
soner has sustained that burden of proving that for want of benefit of
counsel an ingredient of unfairness actively operated in the process that
resulted in confinement."'
. Four factors have been set down as major considerations for granting
counsel under the Betts rule. These are: (i) the gravity of the crime; (,)
the age and education of the accused; (3) the conduct of the court; and
(4) the complicated nature of the case.! Under this rule counsel was found
necessary where an ignorant negro was tried and convicted on the same
day,' and where the accused was a dope addict and drunkard." Counsel
was not found necessary where the accused declined the court's offer to
appoint money for a counsel,1' where the accused had benefit of state's
counsel in the case but not for the preparation of the appeal, 12 and where
the accused was a mature offender. 13 Under the modification of the Betts
rule, counsel was found necessary where the accused was tried, convicted,
and sentenced on the same day,14 but was not found necessary where
the accused had the benefit of counsel for a later charge of burglary,15 and
where the accused was informed of his rights and the degree of proof
necessary for conviction.'
Today, a more liberal and growing view may be seen with the result
that counsel has been allowed in non-capital cases, depending on the
special circumstances of prejudice or unfairness of the case." This new
standard requires that, "where serious offenses are charged, failure of
the court to offer counsel in state criminal cases deprives the accused of
6 Ibid., at 473.
7 Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 137 (1946).
8 Note, 22 Southern California Law Review 268, 269 (1948-49).
9 Coates v. State, iSo Md. 502, 25 A. 2d 676 (1942), cert. denied 317 U.S. 652 (1942).
10 Williams v. State, 163 Ark. 623, 26o SV. 721 (1924).
11 Wilson v. Lanagan, 99 F. 2d 544 (C.A. Ist, 1938), cert. denied 3o6 U.S. 634 (1938).
12 Kelly v. Ragen, 129 F. 2d 811 (C.A. 7th, 1942).
18 Smith v. State, i8o Md. 529, 25 A. 2d 681 (1942).
14 De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1946).
15 Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1946).
16 Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
17 Bute v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 64o , 677-79 (1948).
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his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment." ' In comparison with the
Betts case, it is apparent that the requirement that counsel be necessary for
defendant's adequate defense has been dropped.
In Ex parte Carter,19 an eighteen year old boy of subnormal intelli-
gence, who could not read, entered pleas of non-vault to charges of enter-
ing and breaking and larceny. This was held to be a denial of due process.
The instant case presents an almost identical set of facts, yet these two
cases which were decided within months of each other, reached opposite
results. Each reached their decisions by the application of the reasoning
first presented under Betts v. Brady.20 The latter case admitted that
previous decisions can be of little help, since each case must depend on its
own facts. Such inconsistencies tend to show that the standards now in
existence are wholly inadequate to determine the right to counsel in state
cases. Courts themselves cannot reach any definite solution, even as to the
matter of which standard to apply.
18 Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 440 (1948).
19 14 N.H. Super. 591, 82 A. zd 642 (1951).
2036 US. 455 (1942). Recent cases in which this rule was used are: Gibbs v.
Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (t948); Gholsom v.
Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 8z, 212 S.W. 2d 537 (1948).
